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OPINION OF THE COURT 
 
STAPLETON, Circuit Judge: 
 
Petitioner Charles Walker was convicted and sentenced 
by the Territorial Court of the Virgin Islands for breaking 
various Virgin Islands criminal laws. Following his 
conviction, Walker filed a petition for a writ of habeas 
corpus in the District Court of the Virgin Islands which 
held that it lacked subject-matter jurisdiction over Walker's 
case. Our threshold task in this appeal is to satisfy 
ourselves that we have jurisdiction to entertain it. That task 
requires a review of the statutes and case law governing the 
litigation of habeas corpus petitions in the Virgin Islands. 
We ultimately conclude that we have no jurisdiction in the 
absence of a certificate of appealability issued under 28 
U.S.C. S 2253(c). Because this Court has never held that a 
petitioner in Walker's position must secure a certificate of 
appealability in order to litigate an appeal, we will afford 
him a fair opportunity to request such a certificate and to 
provide support for that request. A certificate will be issued 
only if Walker is able to meet the standard recently 
established in Slack v. McDaniel, ___ U.S. ___, 120 S. Ct. 
1595 (2000). 
 
I. 
 
On November 5, 1996, Charles Walker arrived in St. 
Thomas, Virgin Islands, where he used stolen credit cards 
to purchase approximately $16,000 in jewelry. As he 
attempted to board a flight back to the mainland the 
following day, he was questioned by a United States 
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Customs agent regarding his customs declaration form. 
During the course of their discussion, the customs agent 
apparently looked through Walker's wallet and discovered 
credit cards that did not bear his name and then discovered 
that Walker had not declared the $16,000 in jewelry that he 
purchased. Walker was detained at the airport and arrested 
later that same day. On November 6, 1996, the Government 
of the Virgin Islands charged Walker with three counts of 
credit-card fraud, in violation of 14 V.I.C. S 3004, and two 
counts of possession of stolen property, in violation of 14 
V.I.C. S 2101(a). 
 
Before his trial in the Territorial Court, Walkerfiled a 
suppression motion, arguing that the airport search 
violated his Fourth Amendment rights. His motion was  
denied,1 and he was tried and convicted of all counts. After 
being sentenced to 23 years of imprisonment and a 
$13,000 fine, Walker appealed to the Appellate Division of 
the District Court of the Virgin Islands. Notably, that appeal 
is currently pending. 
 
Thereafter, Walker filed a petition for a writ of habeas 
corpus in the District Court of the Virgin Islands. His 
petition invokes 5 V.I.C. S 1303, the Virgin Islands habeas 
statute, and alleges that he is in custody in violation of his 
Fourth Amendment rights. The District Court dismissed the 
petition for lack of jurisdiction, and Walker appealed to this 
Court. 
 
II. 
 
Ironically, our analysis of our own jurisdiction over this 
appeal requires us to start with the issue that occasions it: 
whether the District Court for the Virgin Islands had 
jurisdiction to entertain Walker's habeas petition. We 
conclude that it did. 
 
Section 1303 of Title 5 of the Virgin Islands Code 
provides that "[t]he writ of habeas corpus may be granted 
by the district court, upon petition by or on behalf of any 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
1. Petitioner also moved to suppress the identification of him by a 
salesperson from the jewelry store while he was detained in a holding 
cell at the airport. That motion was granted. See App. 19. 
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person restrained of his liberty." As we explain in the 
opinion filed today in Callwood v. Enos, ___ F.3d ___ (3d 
Cir. October, 2000), however, this grant of jurisdiction to 
the district court was implicitly repealed on October 1, 
1991, by the enactment of 4 V.I.C. S 76(a) which vested 
original jurisdiction of all local civil actions in the territorial 
courts of the Virgin Islands. Callwood v. Enos , ___ F.3d 
____, ____ (3d Cir. October, 2000). 2 Accordingly, the District 
Court properly held that it was without jurisdiction to grant 
Walker relief under S 1303. But that does not end the 
matter. 
 
In 1984, Congress amended S 22 of the Revised Organic 
Act3 so that it now reads: "The District Court of the Virgin 
Islands shall have the jurisdiction of a District Court of the 
United States, including, but not limited to, the diversity 
jurisdiction provided for in section 1332 of Title 28, and 
that of a bankruptcy court of the United States. . .." 48 
U.S.C. S 1612(a).4 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
2. 4 V.I.C. S 76(a) provides: 
 
        (a) Subject to the original jurisdiction conferred on the District 
       Court by Section 22 of the Revised Organic Act of 1954, as 
       amended, effective October 1, 1991, the Territorial Court shall 
have 
       original jurisdiction in all civil actions regardless of the amount 
in 
       controversy; to supervise and administer estates andfiduciary 
       relations; to appoint and supervise guardians and trustees; to hear 
       and determine juvenile, divorce, annulment and separation 
       proceedings; to grant adoptions and changes of name; to establish 
       paternity; to legitimize children and to make orders and decrees 
       pertaining to the support of relations. 
 
3. The United States Constitution, Article IV, Section 3, "empowers 
Congress to establish all necessary rules and regulations concerning the 
unincorporated territory of the Virgin Islands, including the power to 
designate the jurisdiction of the District Court and the Territorial 
Court." 
Brow v. Farrelly, 994 F.2d 1027, 1032 (3d Cir. 1993). In 1954, Congress 
exercised this power by enacting the Revised Organic Act of the Virgin 
Islands, Act of July 22, 1954, ch. 558, 68 Stat. 497 (codified, as 
amended, at 48 U.S.C. S 1541 et seq.), which represents the "Virgin 
Islands equivalent of a constitution." Brow , 994 F.2d at 1032. 
 
4. When first enacted, S 22 read: 
 
       The District Court of the Virgin Islands shall have the 
jurisdiction of 
       a district court of the United States in all causes arising under 
the 
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In addition, in 1984, Congress added the following 
language to S 23 of the Revised Organic Act to help further 
define the intended relationship between the District Court 
and the Territorial Court. 
 
       The relations between the courts established by the 
       Constitution or laws of the United States and the 
       courts established by local law with respect to appeals, 
       certiorari, removal of causes, the issuance of writs of 
       habeas corpus, and other matters or proceedings shall 
       be governed by the laws of the United States pertaining 
       to the relations between the courts of the United 
       States, including the Supreme Court of the United 
       States, and the courts of the several States in such 
       matters and proceedings . . . . 
 
48 U.S.C. S 1613 (emphasis added). 
 
Finally, in 1984 Congress amended S 24(b) of the Revised 
Organic Act so that it now reads: 
 
       Where appropriate, the provisions of part II of Title 18 
       and of Title 28, and, notwithstanding the provisions of 
       rule 7(a) and of rule 54(a) of the Federal Rules of 
       Criminal Procedure relating to the requirement of 
       indictment and to the prosecution of criminal offenses 
       in the Virgin Islands by information, respectively, the 
       rules of practice heretofore or hereafter promulgated 
       and made effective by the Congress or the Supreme 
       Court of the United States pursuant to Titles 11, 18, 
       and 28 shall apply to the district court and appeals 
       therefrom . . . . 
 
48 U.S.C. S 1614(b). 
 
When read together, we believe that these provisions of 
the Revised Organic Act establish that Congress has given 
jurisdiction to the District Court of the Virgin Islands to 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
       Constitution, treaties and laws of the United States, regardless of 
       the sum or value of the matter in controversy. It shall have 
general 
       original jurisdiction in all other causes in the Virgin Islands, 
       exclusive jurisdiction over which is not conferred by this Act upon 
       the inferior courts of the Virgin Islands. 
 
Act of July 22, 1954, ch. 558, S 22, 68 Stat. 506. 
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issue writs of habeas corpus on behalf of persons held in 
custody pursuant to a judgment of the Territorial Court. 
First, S 22, as amended, affirmatively bestows on the 
District Court of the Virgin Islands the entire jurisdiction of 
a District Court of the United States -- the District Court 
of the Virgin Islands "shall have the jurisdiction of a 
District Court of the United States." 48 U.S.C.S 1612(a) 
(emphasis added). Section 23 then expressly provides that, 
with respect to the issuance of writs of habeas corpus, the 
relationship between the District Court of the Virgin Island 
and the Territorial Court shall be equivalent to the 
relationship between the district courts of the United States 
and the state courts. It follows a fortiori that the District 
Court of the Virgin Islands has jurisdiction to grant writs of 
habeas corpus to persons in custody pursuant to a 
sentence of the Territorial Court. 
 
That the District Court has such power is confirmed by 
S 24(b). That provision can be read in one of two ways. It 
can be understood to mean that either (1) "[w]here 
appropriate, the provisions of part II of Title 18 and of [part 
II of] Title 28 . . . shall apply to the district court and 
appeals therefrom;" or (2) "[w]here appropriate, the 
provisions of part II of Title 18 and [the provisions] of Title 
28 . . . shall apply to the district court and appeals 
therefrom." In short, the issue is whether the prepositional 
phrase, "of Title 28," modifies the subject of the sentence, 
"provisions," or whether it modifies the prepositional 
phrase, "of part II." We read it to modify the former so that 
Congress has specifically provided that, where appropriate, 
the habeas provisions of Title 28 shall apply to the District 
Court of the Virgin Islands.5 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
5. The prior version of S 24(b) read: 
 
       The rules of practice and procedure heretofore or hereafter 
       promulgated and made effective by the supreme Court of the United 
       States pursuant to section 2072 of title 28, United States Code, in 
       civil cases, and section 30 of the Bankruptcy Act in Bankruptcy 
       cases, shall apply to the District Court of the Virgin Islands and 
       appeals therefrom. 
 
Act of July 22, 1954, c. 558, S 25, 68 Stat. 506, 507. 
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We reach this conclusion for two reasons: First, to the 
extent that Congress desired to limit application of 
S 1614(b) to Part II of Title 28, there was no need to include 
an "of " before Title 28. In other words, the grammatically 
preferable way of communicating that desire would have 
been to say: [w]here appropriate, the provisions of part II of 
Title 18 and [the provisions] of Title 28 . . . shall apply to 
the district court and appeals therefrom." Second, and 
more importantly, while Part II of Title 18 governs criminal 
procedure, a topic clearly germane to the courts, Part II of 
Title 28 addresses only the Department of Justice, with 
specific chapters addressing the Attorney General, the FBI, 
the U.S. Attorneys, the U.S. Marshals, the U.S. Trustees, 
and the Independent Counsel. See 28 U.S.C.SS 501-99. We 
can think of no reason why those provisions should apply 
to the District Court of the Virgin Islands, as they are 
addressed solely to the Executive Branch. Thus, we 
conclude that, having vested the District Court of the Virgin 
Islands with the jurisdiction of the district courts of the 
United States, Congress intended all of the provisions of 
Title 28, which speak to procedure, jurisdiction, venue, and 
particular proceedings (e.g., habeas), to apply, "[w]here 
appropriate," to the District Court of the Virgin Islands. 
 
To recapitulate, in 1984 Congress made three significant 
changes to the Revised Organic Act: (1) it unqualifiedly gave 
the District Court of the Virgin Islands the entire 
jurisdiction of the district courts of the United States; (2) it 
specifically provided that, with respect to the granting of 
writs of habeas corpus, the relationship between the 
District Court of the Virgin Islands and the Territorial Court 
shall be equivalent to that of the districts courts of the 
United States and the courts of the several States; and (3) 
it provided that, where appropriate, the provisions of Title 
28 of the United States Code shall apply to the District 
Court of the Virgin Islands. We now hold that, pursuant to 
those amendments, S 2254 of Title 28 applies to the District 
Court of the Virgin Islands so as to confer jurisdiction upon 
it to entertain habeas corpus petitions from those in 
custody pursuant to a judgment of the Territorial Court. 
 
Section 2254 authorizes "a district court [to] entertain an 
application for a writ of habeas corpus in behalf of a person 
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in custody pursuant to a judgment of a State court." Given 
Congress' intent that the relations between the District 
Court of the Virgin Islands and courts established by local 
law should be the same as those between district courts of 
the United States and state courts, we conclude that it is 
"appropriate" under S 24(b) of the Revised Organic Act to 
apply S 2254 to the District Court of the Virgin Islands 
where the petitioner is in custody serving a sentence of the 
Territorial Court.6 
 
Of course, a prisoner may not immediately avail himself 
or herself of the remedies provided by S 2254. Section 
2254(b) expressly requires that "[a]n application for a writ 
of habeas corpus on behalf of a person in custody pursuant 
to the judgment of a State court shall not be granted unless 
it appears that . . . the applicant has exhausted the 
remedies available in the courts of the State." 28 U.S.C. 
S 2254(b)(1)(A); see also Aldan, 718 F.2d at 891 ("the 
requirement of exhaustion of remedies exists to avoid an 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
6. Although the applicability of S 2254 is a novel question in this 
circuit, 
the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals, which has jurisdiction over the 
Territory of Guam, has apparently concluded thatS 2254 applies in 
cases such as this one. Precedent from the Ninth Circuit on this issue 
is particularly persuasive because the jurisdictional statutes that govern 
Guam are identical to those at issue here. See  48 U.S.C. S 1424(b) 
(jurisdiction of the District Court of Guam); id. S 1424-2 (relationship 
between the territorial courts and the District Court); id. S 1424-4 
(applicability of Title 28 to the District Court of Guam). Unfortunately, 
while it appears that the Ninth Circuit agrees thatS 2254 may be applied 
by the District Court of Guam in its review of convictions by the Guam 
territorial courts, there does not seem to be any case which specifically 
addresses the issue. In Aldan v. Salas, 718 F.2d 889 (9th Cir. 1983), 
petitioner sought habeas relief, pursuant to 28 U.S.C. S 2254, from his 
five-year sentence imposed by the Superior Court of Guam, and the 
Ninth Circuit never questioned the applicability ofS 2254. See also 
People v. Taimanglo, Civ. No. 91-0017A, 1991 WL 257357, at *1 (D. 
Guam App. Div. 1991) ("If Taimanglo believes that Guam has violated a 
federal constitutional right, he may file a petition for a writ of habeas 
corpus pursuant to 28 U.S.C. S 2254 in the District Court of Guam in its 
original jurisdiction."); People v. Santos , DCA Crim. No. 85-00006A, 1985 
WL 56576, at *2 (D. Guam App. Div. 1985) ("Defendant-Appellant then 
filed a petition for a Writ of Habeas Corpus in the District Court of Guam 
pursuant to 28 U.S.C. S 2254."). 
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adjudication of territorial criminal convictions by federal 
authorities, wherever possible, to the end that comity may 
be furthered and potential conflict avoided"); see also 
Pador, 653 F.2d at 1279 ("Although Guam is a territory 
rather than a state and appeals from its superior court are 
to a body having federal characteristics [(the Appellate 
Division)], it remains true, as it is in the case of states, that 
ordinarily it is better to require the exhaustion of local 
remedies before entertaining and issuing the writ of habeas 
corpus.").7 As we noted at the outset, Walker's direct appeal 
to the Appellate Division of the District Court is still 
pending. Therefore, the District Court should have 
dismissed his petition, not for lack of subject-matter 
jurisdiction, but for failure to meet the exhaustion 
requirement. 
 
In reaching its conclusion that it was without 
jurisdiction, the District Court relied on our decisions in Ali 
v. Gibson, 572 F.2d 971 (3d Cir. 1978), and Bennett v. Soto, 
850 F.2d 161 (3d Cir. 1988). While that reliance is 
understandable, neither of those cases, in our view, 
requires a conclusion that the District Court lacked 
jurisdiction. 
 
In 1978, we held in Ali that the District Court of the 
Virgin Islands lacked jurisdiction to entertain habeas 
corpus petitions under 28 U.S.C. S 2241. We reasoned: 
 
       Section 2241(a) states that "(w)rits of habeas corpus 
       may be granted by the Supreme Court, any justice 
       thereof, the district courts and any circuit judge .. . ." 
       District courts, as used in this section, "mean the 
       courts constituted by chapter 5" of the code. 28 U.S.C. 
       S 451 (1970). The District Court for the Virgin Islands 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
7. In addition, it bears noting that, while exhaustion is required by 
statute in section-2254 cases, it is also required in section-2241 cases. 
See Schandelmeier v. Cunningham, 819 F.2d 52, 53 (3d Cir. 1986) ("The 
state exhaustion requirement is mandated by statute under 28 U.S.C. 
S 2254(b) and has developed through decisional law in applying 
principles of comity and federalism as to claims brought under 28 U.S.C. 
S 2241."); see also Pador, 653 F.2d at 1279 ("ordinarily it is better to 
require the exhaustion of local remedies before entertaining and issuing 
the writ of habeas corpus."). 
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       is not such a court. See 28 U.S.C. SS 81-131 (1970). 
       This action, therefore, could not be brought under the 
       federal habeas corpus statute . . . . 
 
Ali, 572 F.2d at 974. Because the parallel text of 28 U.S.C. 
S 2254 is virtually the same, this rationale dictated a 
conclusion that S 2254, like S 2241, conferred no habeas 
jurisdiction on the District Court of the Virgin Islands. Ali's 
holding and its implication with respect to S 2254 were 
clearly correct under the law as it existed in 1978. They are 
also clearly inconsistent, however, with Congress' 1984 
amendments to the Revised Organic Act which dictate that 
the District Court of the Virgin Islands shall have the same 
habeas jurisdiction to review judgments of the Territorial 
Court as the District Courts of the United States have to 
review judgments of state courts. Ali was thus overruled by 
Congress in 1984. 
 
It is true, as the respondent stresses, that Ali  was cited 
with approval by this Court in Bennett after the 1984 
amendments to the Revised Organic Act went into effect. 
There, the petitioner sought to challenge the discretionary 
decision by the Virgin Islands Board of Parole to revoke his 
parole. The Court noted that "[o]rdinarily, a federal habeas 
corpus challenge to a parole board's decision is properly 
brought under 28 U.S.C. S 2241." Bennett, 850 F.2d at 163. 
The Court then recognized, however, that, "as we held in 
Ali, there was no jurisdictional authority for the district 
court over [the] section 2241 claim." Id. Nevertheless, the 
Court ultimately concluded that 5 V.I.C. S 1303 conferred 
jurisdiction on the District Court to entertain the 
petitioner's claim. 
 
Bennett was a pro se case, and the 1984 amendments to 
the Revised Organic Act were not brought to the attention 
of the Court. They are not mentioned in the opinion. While 
this fact alone does not mean that our panel is entitled to 
ignore the holding in Bennett, this Court's comments 
regarding Ali were not a part of the holding there. The 
holding of the Court in Bennett was that it had jurisdiction 
under 5 V.I.C. S 1303.8 In the course of reaching that 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
8. Bennett was decided prior to the October 1, 1991, effective date of 4 
V.I.C. S 76(a) and the implied repeal of the jurisdictional grant to the 
District Court in S 1303. See Callwood v. Enos, ____ F.3d ____, ____ (3d 
Cir. October, 2000). 
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result, it rejected an argument that jurisdiction existed 
under 28 U.S.C. S 2241. That rejection, however, was not 
necessary to the Bennett Court's holding that it possessed 
jurisdiction under S 1303, and we are, accordingly, not 
bound by that rejection. 
 
III. 
 
With this foundation, we are in a position to directly 
address the issue of our own jurisdiction. Section 2253(a) 
of Title 28 provides as follows: 
 
        In a habeas corpus proceeding [under sections 2241 
       or 2254] or a proceeding under section 2255 [brought 
       by prisoners in custody under sentence of a court 
       established by Congress] before a district judge, the 
       final order shall be subject to review, on appeal, by the 
       Court of Appeals for the Circuit in which the 
       proceeding is held. 
 
Under our previously discussed reading of SS 22, 23 and 
24(b) of the Revised Organic Act, it necessarily follows that 
the proceeding in this case before a district judge of the 
Virgin Islands was a proceeding within the scope of 
S 2253(a) and that that section provides our statutory 
authority for entertaining this appeal. It also follows that 
our jurisdiction is limited by the provisions ofS 2253. 
 
Section 2253 provides: 
 
       (c)(1) Unless a circuit justice or judge issues a 
       certificate of appealability, an appeal may not be taken 
       to the court of appeals from -- 
 
        (A) the final order in a habeas corpus proceeding in 
       which the detention complained of arises out of process 
       issued by a State court; or 
 
        (B) the final order in a proceeding under section 
       2255. 
 
       (2) A certificate of appealability may issue under 
       paragraph (1) only if the applicant has made a 
       substantial showing of the denial of a constitutional 
       right. 
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28 U.S.C. S 2253(c)(1)-(2). Walker, of course, is being 
detained neither by "process issued by a state court" nor 
"under sentence of a court established by an Act of 
Congress." He is in custody under a sentence imposed by 
the Territorial Court, a court created by the Virgin Islands 
legislature. Nevertheless, as we have indicated, our reading 
of S 22, 23 and 24(b) of the Revised Organic Act convinces 
us that Congress intended the Territorial Court of the 
Virgin Islands to be treated as a state court for purposes of 
the federal habeas laws. Accordingly, we hold that a person 
in custody pursuant to the sentence of the Territorial Court 
of the Virgin Islands who is seeking to appeal a judgment 
of the District Court of the Virgin Islands denyingS 2254 
relief must first obtain a certificate of appealability from 
this Court. 
 
IV. 
 
As noted, S 2253(c) permits a court of appeals to grant 
certificates of appealability "only if the applicant has made 
a substantial showing of the denial of a constitutional 
right." The Supreme Court has recently explained how this 
provision is to be applied in a situation like this where the 
District Court has denied relief without reaching the merits 
of the constitutional claim and where the constitutional 
claim is accordingly not the subject matter of the appeal. In 
Slack v. McDaniel, ___ U.S. ___, ___, 120 S. Ct. 1595, 1604 
(2000), it held: "When the district court denies a habeas 
petition on procedural grounds without reaching the 
prisoner's underlying constitutional claim, a [certificate of 
appealability] should issue when the prisoner shows, at 
least, that jurists of reason would find it debatable whether 
the petition states a valid claim of the denial of a 
constitutional right and that jurists of reason would find it 
debatable whether the district court was correct in its 
procedural ruling." The analysis as to whether a certificate 
of appealability should issue to review a procedural 
question, thus, has "two components, one directed at the 
underlying constitutional claims and one directed at the 
district court's procedural holding." Id. 
 
We think it clear that "jurists of reason wouldfind it 
debatable whether the district court was correct in its 
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procedural ruling" in this case. If the same were true of the 
merits of Walker's underlying constitutional claims, we 
would be inclined to treat his notice of appeal as an 
application for a certificate of appealability and grant that 
application. See, e.g., Miller v. New Jersey State Dep't of 
Corrections, 145 F.3d 616, 617 (3d Cir. 1998). However, the 
current record does not contain sufficient information to 
evaluate his petition under the standard announced in 
Slack. Because we have not previously held thatS 2253(c) 
applies to an appeal like Walker's, we will afford him a 
further opportunity to file an application for a certificate of 
appealability and to provide support sufficient to meet the 
standard established by Slack. 
 
Because of the unusual context in which this case arises, 
we have been required in the course of our jurisdictional 
inquiry to decide the very issue that Walker seeks to have 
resolved in this appeal -- the issue of whether the District 
Court has jurisdiction to grant him habeas relief. This may 
mean that Walker will choose not to file an application for 
a certificate of appealability and, instead, take the steps 
necessary to exhaust the remedies available to him other 
than under S 2254. This will, of course, include whatever 
steps are necessary to secure a disposition of direct appeal. 
If Walker does not secure relief in that appeal, exhaustion, 
as we explain in Callwood, may also require him to file a 
post-conviction relief petition in the Territorial Court.9 
 
V. 
 
Within twenty days of the issuance of this opinion, 
Walker may file with this Court an application for a 
certificate of appealability and a supporting affidavit. If 
such an application is not timely filed, this appeal will be 
dismissed pursuant to 28 U.S.C. S 2253(c)(1). 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
9. We express no opinion on whether the District Court's order 
dismissing the petition for want of jurisdiction, if not reversed or 
vacated 
on appeal, will have collateral consequences should Walker file another 
S 2254 petition in the District Court after exhausting his other remedies. 
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